The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is tightening requirements for states seeking federal election security grants, linking full funding to the implementation of random post-election audits. This policy shift comes amid growing federal concerns about the use of China-manufactured components in U.S. voting machines and the potential cybersecurity risks they may pose.
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The move reflects heightened scrutiny of the nation’s election infrastructure, with DHS making clear that federal support will depend on states’ willingness to verify election results and address vulnerabilities in the supply chain.
DHS Audit Requirement and Rationale
Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin outlined the new grant conditions in a memo to the White House Transparency Task Force. According to Mullin, states must “trust but verify the results produced by the voting machines.” To qualify for full awards under the Homeland Security Grant Program, states are now required to conduct random manual counts of paper ballots after elections. Typically, this means auditing about 5% of ballots, a senior White House official said.
Mullin stressed that these audits are a key part of DHS’s broader efforts to secure election infrastructure. He warned that vulnerabilities in the supply chain could allow malicious actors to compromise election systems at any stage, even before machines are assembled or deployed.
"If a component is tampered with during manufacturing, it could serve as a point of entry for hackers, allowing for the possibility of synchronized attacks across multiple machines and jurisdictions."
— Markwayne Mullin, Homeland Security Secretary
The requirement for post-election audits is designed to provide an additional layer of verification, making it more difficult for any potential tampering—whether foreign or domestic—to go undetected. DHS officials argue that these audits are a practical step to increase transparency and public confidence in election outcomes.
Foreign Components and Security Risks
Three major voting system vendors—ES&S, Hart InterCivic, and Dominion—supply more than 80% of the U.S. market. All three have acknowledged using parts sourced from China. Mullin noted that, like other critical infrastructure sectors, the voting-system industry often cannot source all necessary components domestically, making some reliance on foreign suppliers unavoidable.
A 2020 hearing by the House Administration Committee, then under Democratic control, confirmed that executives from leading voting machine companies relied on Chinese parts. This fact has drawn bipartisan attention in recent years, as lawmakers from both parties have raised concerns about the potential for foreign-made components to be exploited as entry points for cyberattacks.
Mullin’s memo warned that vulnerabilities in foreign-manufactured components could be used by adversaries to compromise election infrastructure. The issue has become more pressing as the U.S. faces ongoing threats from nation-state actors seeking to interfere with or undermine confidence in American elections.
Intelligence Assessments and Ongoing Threats
A declassified National Intelligence Council memorandum from October 2024 assessed that U.S. adversaries—including China, Iran, and Russia—possess the technical capability to access some election-related networks and systems. However, the memo concluded that foreign actors “will probably refrain from disruptive attacks that seek to alter vote counts” due to the risk of detection and retaliation. Importantly, it found no indication of such attacks in the previous two election cycles. This assessment is echoed in the NICM-Declassified Foreign Threats to US Elections.
The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence described China as “the most active and persistent cyber threat to U.S. government, private-sector, and critical infrastructure networks.” The report cited Beijing’s cyber espionage activities and technology exports as ongoing risks to U.S. security.
A senior White House official reiterated that, to date, there is no evidence that China or any other foreign country has altered vote counts in U.S. elections. Supporters of the current system argue that multiple layers of security and transparency, including paper ballot audits, help safeguard election integrity and make large-scale tampering difficult to conceal.
Broader Context and Next Steps
The debate over foreign-made voting machine components has intensified as states and federal agencies work to bolster election security. The DHS grant policy adds financial leverage to encourage post-election audits, a measure that some states have resisted in the past due to concerns about cost, logistics, or political implications.
Vendors and election officials have acknowledged the challenges of sourcing all components domestically, citing global supply chain realities. Critics, however, continue to press for stricter controls and greater transparency in the manufacturing and sourcing of election technology.
The new DHS requirement is expected to prompt further discussion among state officials, voting system vendors, and lawmakers about how best to balance security, cost, and supply chain realities ahead of future elections. As the 2024 election cycle approaches, the issue of foreign components in voting machines—and the broader question of election security—remains a central focus for policymakers and the public alike.
By tying federal funding to post-election audits, DHS aims to strengthen the integrity of U.S. elections and address concerns about potential vulnerabilities, even as intelligence assessments continue to find no evidence of successful foreign interference in vote tabulation.
